In this paper, we analyse whether there has been any convergence in statutory corporate tax rates within a pool of European countries. We find that there has been some degree of convergence; specifically we find four main convergence clubs.
Introduction
Europe, and in particular EU member states 1 , have applied a series of harmonisation measures in order to move towards a more integrated economic area. However, tax systems and, fiscal policy more generally, have been left to the discretion of each of the countries. In this paper we analyse to what extent these countries have converged in their corporate tax rates.
Past studies have found a declining trend in corporate income tax rates around the world (and certainly including Europe), including Slemond (2004) and Devereux et al. (2008) for developed countries and Abbas and Klemm (2013) for transitional and developing countries. This paper is one of a small number of recent contributions that examine the related but separate research question: is there also a negative trend in the dispersion of corporate tax rates? Rather than a single measure of central tendency,
we look at the evolution of the whole distribution. The heterogeneity in tax setting in
Europe is analysed by applying the new methodology of cluster analysis and panel convergence proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007; 2009) .
Studies of tax convergence usually focus on the tax burden and fiscal pressure (e.g. Delgado and Presno, 2010; Apergis and Cooray, 2013) . In this study, by contrast, the variable of interest is the statutory tax rate, rather than revenue, using data from the OECD tax database supplemented with the World Tax Database and the KPMG Corporate and Indirect Tax Rate Survey (2009-2014) . The rest of this note is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the tax convergence issue and Section 3 the results. The last section concludes. Phillips and Sul (2007) However, Phillips and Sul (2009) state that the algorithm in Phillips and Sul (2007) tends to over-estimate the number of convergence clubs. Hence, they propose to merge the cluster using the same test.
Tax convergence
The idea behind the Sul (2007, 2009 ) method is to test whether idiosyncratic components within a group of individuals convergence to a common factor. If that is the case, then we can say that there is evidence of convergence.
Results
Applying the cluster algorithm, five convergence clubs are found. They have been ordered in Table 1 Figure 3 shows that dispersion within clubs is falling over time.
Cyprus, Ireland and Switzerland, the members of Club A with the lowest tax rates of the sample, are usually considered to be tax havens. Cluster C is composed of the countries that had high rates in 1980 and become the highest at the end of the period.
Cluster B consists of the remainder countries which are EU member states plus Norway.
In The tax competition literature has proposed that convergence may be explained by strategic behaviour of governments competing for the location of corporations (e.g. Slemrod, 2004) . The convergence result would reinforce the general wisdom that tax competition amongst regions produces a Nash equilibrium and, at the same time, would help to identify which countries are competing with each other.
Tax convergence may be part of globalisation and economic integration in Europe.
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Conclusions
In Europe, tax convergence has taken the form of club convergence. Overall, the 
